Development and the Asian State: Providing an Enabling and Facilitating Environment for Decentralized, Participatory and People-Centered Development

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The Asian state's role in pursuing decentralized, participatory and people-centered development has through the years shifted from being the main player in society to that of enabler and facilitator. To illustrate the enabling and facilitating roles assumed by the Asian state, four case programs have been documented, namely: the Saemaul Undong *Program of Korea, the* Kaunlaran sa Pagkakaisa *Program of the Philippines, the* Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya *of Sri Lanka, and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. Two of these cases are government programs reaching out to civil society, and the other two are NGOs linking on various occasions with the state. As enabler, the state allows NGOs and all within its borders to exercise basic freedoms of expression and assembly, recognizes the special qualities of the NGOs, encourages programs that share the same goals of development as the state, and creates governmental bodies with authority to assist more than regulate NGOs. As facilitator, the state usually provides funds, training, research, information and other means of technical advice and assistance.*

Introduction

The twenty-first century is already being called the "Asian Century" as the region even now is attracting attention for the dynamism, growth and emerging prosperity of many of its countries. Nevertheless, Asia has human misery, environmental despoliation, and oppression as daunting as any seen in the world. To attain its positive promise, the countries of the Region must move towards a development that uplifts the human beings of this generation and others. The emerging consensus is that such a development must be centered on people and be decentralized and participatory as well. All sectors

of the society—the state, the market, the citizenry—must find their appropriate place in this challenging adventure. The role of the state is crucial as it is now being called upon to provide an enabling and facilitating environment for the attainment of such a people-centered development.

This paper zeroes in on the role of the state in fulfilling the promise of the Asian Century.   Specifically, it would undertake the following:

(1)   Situate the discussion in the Asian context;

(2)   Lay out the emerging common goals of nations, as embodied in the current understanding of "development;"

(3)   Discuss the role of key actors in the development process, particularly the interrelationship of state and civil society in working toward that goal;

(4)   Present programs that demonstrate the promotion of decentralized and participatory people-centered development and based on the preceding; and

(5)   Suggest how the state might provide an enabling and facilitating environment for the attainment of sustainable human development.

This article is little more than a think-piece about the possible role of the state in a particular concept of development that is only now being crystallized. It attempts to handle this difficult topic in two ways: first by summarizing and integrating ideas from the extensive literature regarding its main concepts, "people-centered development" and "the role of the state;" and second by describing approaches to that kind of development in actual practice in contemporary Asia and analyzing the particular roles the state played there. Aside from substantive criteria to be discussed below, the choice of cases was affected by the following: (a) availability of materials written from the perspectives of government and of the nongovernmental organization under study; (b) country distribution, i.e., no two cases are from the same country; and (c) representation from as many subregions as possible. The work has been limited by time constraints, dependence on publications available in the Philippines, and possibly, errors of interpretation of materials, especially since most have been written for other purposes.

The Asia Region

Optimistic books about Asia predict that "it will become the dominant region of the world: economically, politically and culturally" (Naisbitt 1995: vii)

and be the site of "history's biggest middle class [which] will change the world" (Rohwer 1995: subtitle). Such forecasts are based on the performance of its fastest growing economies, the available and exploitable resources in the region, the size of its markets, the rate of its urbanization and modernization, and its huge population base. Nevertheless, there are downsides: while some of the world's richest families are Asian, the region is marked by pervasive poverty, disease and powerlessness, a huge gap between the rich and the poor, and teeming metropolises with huge squatter colonies, desolate countrysides and dwindling forests.

These characteristics vary widely within and among countries. "Asia" remains, for many, a term of geographic convenience rather than a regional community. And there are other important qualities where they differ. The East Asian boom must make an exception of Japan and China for different reasons, and the Southeast Asian one, of the Philippines and Myanmar, for still others. Like them, South Asia is home to a multitude of languages, religions and states which have been in conflict situations. The former Soviet Republics on the Asian continent are just now inserting themselves into the other nations' consciousness as part of Asia, too. By colonial experience, most of Asia can be grouped under the French and British Raj, but the "other" category would still be numerous, including those that were under other colonials and those that were not colonized but were heavily influenced and infiltrated by Western countries nonetheless.

The states of Asia also retain many distinctions. They vary in the level of democratization or authoritarianism, the dominating or subordinate role of their military and civil bureaucracies vis-a-vis political leaders, the freedoms they accord to their civil societies, the openness of their political institutions, their commitment to the liberalization or closure of their economies. Nevertheless, they recognize that they live in an increasingly interdependent and global system. The contemporary demand for a new kind of development cannot fail to affect them, no matter how autonomous and distinct they prefer to be as a nation. It is for this reason that a discussion of roles a state can play in this developmental quest could be useful, particularly in giving ideas on how they can accelerate this process through civil society organizations.

The Concept of Development

Since the Second World War, the concept of development has had an interesting career. Its first major referent was economic growth, and increase of production and productivity, its principal element. This was the idea espoused by the United Nations' First Development Decade which aimed to see all nations prosper like the Western countries of the First World.

Development was blueprinted in successive medium-term plans of each member-nation, taking note of the UN's indicative objective of "a minimum annual rate of growth in aggregate national income of five percent by the end of the decade" (Resolution 1710 of the UN General Assembly 1961, cited in Brookfield 1975). Each government promulgated fiscal, monetary and economic policies to regulate the behavior of the people and the market or took over the economy itself.

The Decade succeeded on its own terms: the average annual compound rates of growth of GNP for 96 countries was higher than the UN targeted five percent for 1968, 1969, and 1970 (Pajestka 1972: 31). However, good performers were predominantly in the Mediterranean, Latin America and East Asia, with Africa and South Asia growing at lower rates (Brookfield 1974: 42-43). Worse, that development brought on its wings continued and worsening poverty of large numbers of the population, growing inequality between the rich and the poor, widening disparity between urban and rural areas. These combined with the accelerated degradation of the environment as by-products of mechanization and industrialization, the explosive rise of population, overconsumption and waste.

Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs resulted in a much more complex view of development. While sustainable human development would become the catchword only by the 1990s, the seeds for many of its elements were planted in the late 1960s and the 1970s (e.g., Seers 1969; Goulet 1971; Ward and Dubos 1972; Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, henceforth, DHF, 1975; Brookfield 1975). The current view of development includes the following elements:

(1) It is, first and foremost, human development: the development of every man and woman—of the whole man and woman—and not just the growth of things, which are merely means. Development is geared to the satisfaction of needs beginning with the basic needs of the poor who constitute the world's majority; at the same time, development ensures the humanization of man by the satisfaction of his needs for expression, creativity, conviviality, and for deciding his own destiny (DHF 1975: 7).

(2) Centering on people can still alienate and dehumanize unless they become the subject—not the object—of development. This requires that they play "an active role in determining how development should be unfurled and how [they] should figure in the process" (Alfiler 1983: 24). Such involvement must draw on their inner core and self-reliance. In these, two means have been advanced: popular participation—the people's development of their "autonomous capacity to develop and take decisions" (DHF 1974:

35); and decentralization, bringing down decisionmaking to the level closest to the people.

(3)   This development is not the advancement of individuated human beings, but the growth and strengthening of what has been called "social capital" (Banuri, Hyden, Juma and Rivera 1994: 6-7). "Social capital" encompasses the "processes between people which establish networks, norms and social trust and facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Cox 1995: 21). This is the fabric that makes participation and decentralization redound to the good of society.

(4)   This development is a multidimensional process. Though centered on people, it does not reject growth which is needed for the poor to have quality life. Though stressing the importance of social capital, it recognizes the continuing role of finance, physical capital and individual skills and knowledge. Though highlighting cooperation, it remains cognizant of the potency of conflict and the role of the distribution of power and other resources in advancing or hindering human progress.

(5)   This development is "in harmony with the environment." It recognizes that social and natural systems are interrelated, and survival of the race "prohibits the transgression of the 'outer limits' of the biosphere" (DHF 1974: 28).

(6)   The environmental issue brings to the fore the issue of sustainability (WCED 1987). Sustainable development is "a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments and the orientation of technological development and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs" (Reid 1995: 58).

(7)   The awareness of "only one earth" also underscores the global dimension of development. While the First Development Decade saw the international interrelationship of development as primarily an issue of benign and asymmetrical aid flows to the less developed countries, the new concept highlights the interdependence of nations amidst the recognition that some past and current linkages may have contributed to underdevelopment instead of development (Frank 1966).

State, Market and Civil Society

Three major actors are expected to play a role in attaining development: the state, the market and civil society. The laissez faire concept, dominant

since the Industrial Revolution, gives the principal role to the market. Government is needed only to nurture the climate that would allow it to grow. But these tasks are substantial. The usual functions allocated to the state are the maintenance of peace and order, foreign affairs, and infrastructure development.   Even Adam Smith, who theorized on the superiority of the "hidden hand," wanted the state to intervene in market processes "in order to insure justice" and "to insure that all had equal opportunities for a 'fully human life' " (quoted in Hart and Wright 1994: 161).

The period covering the quarter century after the Second World War saw the state in the lead role in the functioning of the economy.   Influential Western economists like Arthur Pigou and John Maynard Keynes gave theoretical justification for the state to manipulate price signals and fight unemployment and business cycles. Meanwhile, socialist countries installed and consolidated central planning systems (Chang and Rowthorn 1995: 1-2). And in newly independent erstwhile colonies, the state was "the principal planner, energizer, promoter, and director of the accelerated development effort" (Lewis 1964: 26).

The interventionist state was discredited by the burgeoning welfare bill and concomitant institutional problems in the First World, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Second. In the Third World, state orchestration seemed to fail in either of two counts: to achieve prosperity, or, attaining it, to provide basic needs. Further, governmental rent-seeking, inefficiency and corruption, and international aid agencies' bias towards privatization pushed the state away from its central economic role. The private sector once again gained the sobriquet of the engine of development.   But by itself, the market had no reason to consider the distributional and environmental questions that led to the rethinking of development as growth in the first place.

That inability of economic gains to effect acceptable levels of redistribution, poverty reduction, and political freedoms woke up civil society. It unleashed hosts of people to devote their energies to the third type of human action (after family and work): "the public life in which [they] collectively create civil spheres" (Hannah Arendt, as rendered by Cox 1995: 7). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have sprung up not only to serve as alternative delivery channels for a whole gamut of social services but also to fight repressive state authority, protect the environment, work with victims of sweatshops and harmful products released by profit-seeking enterprises, demand alternative social policies, and demonstrate their own models of the development desired.

It is easy to romanticize the role of civil society, so this lengthy quotation from Seligman (1993: 159) should serve as a warning:

> Civil society is at the same time, that realm of "natural affections and sociability" recognized by Adam Smith as well as that arena where man "acts as a private individual, regards other men as means, degrades himself into a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers"—in Marx's famous characterization of market relations. It is the realm of rights but also of property, of civility, but also of economic exploitation.... Apart from the state it is nevertheless regulated by law. A public realm, yet one constituted by private individuals.

The prevailing theory followed by aid-giving agencies is that the state must allow the market to take over the central role. Yet, Asian countries which have developed show states that have not shirked from exerting a strong presence in the economy.[1] In the terms of this article, they provided an effective enabling and facilitating setting for economic growth. It is hypothesized here that that role is required for the policy environment for people-centered development also.

An Enabling State. Effective governance does not connote a state in retreat. Rather it is a state that has a palpable presence in the economy and society without dominating it, a strong entity that recognizes the autonomy of the sectors but does not overwhelm them. In Osborne and Gaebler's felicitous phrase (1992), a "reinvented" government "steers but does not row." It works in the background, creating an environment that enables and facilitates the market and the civil society to make their own creative and decisive contributions.

The functions of "enabling" and "facilitating" are analogous to the hygiene and motivation factors in Frederick Herzberg's motivation theory of organizations (Hersey and Blanchard 1988). Enabling mechanisms are hygiene factors, conditions without which the hands of actors within a jurisdiction would be tied. Facilitating mechanisms are motivators, factors that push the actors to demonstrate a new way of increasing social access or to experiment on an untried social reform.

The state as enabler provides the legal and regulatory framework and political order within which firms and organizations can plan and act. In a sense, it is the task of the state *qua* state: "that organization that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way" (Migdal 1988: 19). For instance, it can encourage citizen action by liberating NGOs from the fear of the military when they criticize policies or serve oppressed groups. It can assure private firms that they will not find policies changed in the midstream flow of their investments because of the caprice or private interests of political officials.

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In general, the state enables development by living by the norms of accountability, transparency and predictability, and committing itself to rule-bound decisionmaking and action in both political and administrative levels. Enabling mechanisms include just laws, a fair judicial system, politically accountable lawmaking, and an effective and reform-minded public bureaucracy (Root 1995).

It is worthwhile to repeat here "the important distinction between government acting *to meet a need for people* and government acting *to create an enabling setting within which people can be more effective in meeting those needs for themselves*" (Korten 1984: 302, italics in original). "To enable" is to make changes in the law and incentive structure and to develop local capacity rather than to manage resources or to deliver services directly (Korten 1984: 303).

The policy environment created by the state may fall into one of three types: "highly restrictive," where the laws tend to censor NGO actions, do not guarantee basic freedoms, and require NGOs to seek permission to organize meetings or receive foreign funds; "regulative," where the state sets broad parameters for NGO activities and allows the exercise of basic freedoms; and "supportive," where the state actively promotes collaboration with NGOs which are guaranteed the basic freedoms (ANGOC 1995: 22). Only the last two types would be characteristic of an "enabling state."

A Facilitating State. The other role the state is called upon to do is "to facilitate," i.e., "to render easier the performance of (an action), the attainment of (a result); to afford facilities for, promote, help forward (an action or process)" (Hart and Wright 1994: 147, citing dictionary definitions). Like "enabling," it is not a takeover of that entity's task, but a means to allow its work to flow more smoothly and with less problems.

The state as facilitator provides resources to assist markets and communities. Facilitating may include giving grants for volunteer efforts, and subsidies or tax exemptions to corporations. The state may also facilitate the market and civil society's contributions to development by the provision of information, technical expertise and advice, role modeling and piloting, and research and development schemes. It may promote the work of these organizations through incentive schemes or actual purchase of their goods and services. Facilities given to firms and organizations are positive as well as additional provisions of the state for the accomplishment of mutually desired goals.

Roles Played by the Third Sector[2]

The Third Sector interfaces with the state at both political and administrative levels. In general, nonprofit organizations push policymakers

to insert distributional criteria in their development strategies (Deyo 1990: 180;   see also Kaufman 1990; Farrington and Lewis 1993). Meanwhile, as implementors, popular organizations may play three roles vis-a-vis the state. They may be "competitors" who pursue alternative programs or approaches, "complements" that extend the reach of government, or "collaborators" that undertake programs with or for the state.

Competitors are critics of the state who go beyond opposition and debate into demonstrating that their criticisms are capable of being implemented on the ground. At their genesis, competitors may eschew any linkage with the state and may get their funding from local or international foundations. As such, their relationship with government is often conflictive and confrontational.

Nevertheless, competitors can contribute to the development process if their programs are given careful study. Thus, such competitors can teach new approaches that can enhance the delivery of government services. Besides, since many of them venture into territory not served by government, their work effectively complements the bureaucracy even when they set out to be an alternative to it.

Complements to the bureaucracy extend the government's service delivery system, mobilize people to avail themselves of government services and push government to provide these services, provide services that government cannot or does not want to provide (for instance, certain family planning methods), and serve in territories unreached by government (Siedentopf 1987, based on a study of 23 Asian NGOs).

From the side of the state, the bureaucracy may complement NGOs by providing nationwide coverage since only government has programs and personnel throughout its jurisdiction. Government can also provide the "scale-up," that is, building small village experiments into a network of programs all the way to a national scheme, like the multi-tiered referral system of a national health care program (Farrington and Lewis 1993; Cariño and Associates 1982).

The third role of NGOs is as collaborator of government. Collaboration does not just come in at the delivery process as a complement or competitor does, but gets involved in practically all phases of community organization and program management, including planning, fund-raising, management capacitation, social preparation and other processes. The government is also not merely a fund provider, monitor or regulator.

Collaboration ranges from networking to full partnership. As networkers, NGOs and government may engage in exchange of information, personnel and

technologies. As partners, both sides may agree to contribute to a common program, based on perceived comparative advantages of each (Farrington and Lewis 1993: 302-05, 308-10).

Examples of Development Programs

Asia has been the venue of innovative programs that have consciously attempted to operationalize a concept of development similar to the one set forth above. Four have been selected based on their recognition as examples of "good practice" in terms not only of awards received but also by the attention given them by scholars. All have been in continuous existence for at least ten years. Two are government programs which work closely with civil society organizations: the *Saemaul Undong* Program of Korea, started in 1971, and the *Kaunlaran sa Pagkakaisa* Program of the Philippines (1986). The other two are NGOs registered with the state: the *Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya* of Sri Lanka, founded in 1958 and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) (1971).

Saemaul Undong (Korea)

Korea is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Its transformation from an agriculture-based to a modern industrialized economy took place within only three decades. The government's determination to spur rural development was such that a quarter of its public investments was allocated to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Some of these were part of the Saemaul Undong movement (Kim and Leipziger 1993: 6).

Background to the Program. Saemaul Undong may be traced to programs for self-help and community development, land reform and rural development, and local autonomy. Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) initiated a people's self-help movement to revive agriculture. This was criticized as highly bureaucratized and centralized, and geared more to Japanese rather than Korean interests (Boyer and Ahn 1991). American rural development efforts (1945-61) were also perceived as strengthening rural communities not for their own sakes but simply to feed urban residents (Whang 1986). This rural-urban rivalry would recur in other periods and would be a key feature in the decision to create the Saemaul Undong.

In 1949, the National Assembly instituted land reform, a measure which significantly set the stage for Korea's economic success (Ro 1993: 64). At the same time, President Rhee initiated a Community Development Program with few dramatic results (Boyer and Ahn 1991).

A student revolution in 1960 brought down Rhee and in the brief democratic episode that ensued, local administrators were elected. Park Chung Hee staged a military coup in May 1961, dismissed all local councils, and resumed appointive local governments. The new regime initiated two Five-year Development Plans from 1962 to 1971. During this period, the government-led development propelled Korea's economic growth to 9.7 percent annually. Income per capita rose from US$83 in 1961 to US$266 in 1971. However there was wide dissatisfaction due to the growing disparity between the urban and rural societies and the rural population declined from 72 to 58 percent (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 32).

Genesis of the Saemaul Undong. Saemaul Undong is a comprehensive rural development program started by Park a decade after he gained power. The Saemaul Undong movement is regarded as an important part of Korea's development miracle. Saemaul Undong was initially conceptualized to be a "movement for better living" (Saemaul 1983). Later it was called a "national movement for social enlightenment" (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 33) and a "we too can prosper" movement (Saemaul 1988). Its success has been attributed to highly motivated village people; community-based leadership; efficient local officials; and the government's all-out commitment (Whang 1986).

Based on the motto of "frontier exploration, creation, and voluntary services" (Saemaul 1986: 29), the movement aimed "to promote cooperative development efforts by villages, guided by competent and motivated village leaders with judicious government aid through technical and financial assistance and the training of local leaders" (Ro 1993).

The creation of Saemaul Undong has been explained as a response to the prolonged misery suffered by rural Koreans from the Japanese occupation onwards (Saemaul 1983: 20). It has also been traced to President Park's particular fondness for the countryside and his desire to gain adequate rural support (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 27). Another rationale was the need to balance growth between urban and rural areas (Ro 1993: 50).

Programs. Saemaul Undong started with programs in infrastructure and environment betterment, which became means for local organization and mobilization. It then incorporated leadership training not only of Saemaul leaders but also of officials at other levels of government. Later it metamorphosed into a general development program.

(a)   Infrastructure and Environment Betterment

In the beginning stage (1970-72), Saemaul Undong distributed cement, gravel, and other construction materials to be used at the full discretion of the

village people. Along with these donations, it provided technical advice to villagers, skipping normal bureaucratic channels when necessary.

Accordingly, the first programs were physical and environment improvement projects directly relevant to the lives of the villagers. These included projects to reforest nearby terrain, broaden access roads, repair and improve dikes, prepare compost barns, clean ditches and gutters, construct community wells, exterminate rats, and establish village laundry facilities. Aside from such tangible projects, the movement was aiming at changing people's attitudes and imbuing the rural people with the "Saemaul Spirit."

(b)   Local Organization and Mobilization

The grant of construction materials had only one requirement: the totally new demand of collective decisionmaking by the villagers. The exercise became protracted and difficult. But it triggered the formation of the village general assembly that became the venue for people participation and the channel for decisionmaking and consensus building on major community issues. Whang (1986) suggests that many innovations and stimulation for new ideas did come from outside the village. The political system played an important role in initiating these development activities through incentives, and at times, authoritarian sanctions. He did not deny, however, that the adoption or rejection of these new ideas was made by the villagers themselves.

After individual projects came development plans formulated by the village development committee and presented to the general assembly of household heads. The assembly factored in the financial and labor input to be rendered by the village as well as the amount to be solicited from local authorities. This plan was then submitted to the sub-county development council which set the priorities at that level. The sub-county then forwarded the plan to the county level for a similar process. Eventually, the provincial level would submit the plan to the Ministry of Home Affairs which would present the plan to the inter-ministerial conference. After further examination by the Economic Planning Board, the plan would be approved by the National Assembly. Reportedly, decisionmaking from sub-county to province took not more than ten days after receiving the plan from the next lower levels (Dore and Mars 1981: 72-73).

(c)   Leadership Training

In 1971, President Park instructed the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries "to produce village leaders from among the villagers themselves." This led to the establishment of the Training Institute of Saemaul Center for the movement's leaders, government officials, and people from other sectors. The Institute was not expected so much to impart new techniques in

agriculture. Instead, it aimed to change the attitude of the trainees through intensive sessions as well as through interactions with co-participants from different sectors and levels of the power structure. The training thus systematically tried to produce a core of inspired people who, in turn, would diffuse the values of integrity, self-confidence, cooperation, modern outlook and optimism to their fellows.

(d)   A Movement for Rural and Overall Development

In mid-1973, inspired by the success of the first two years, the government declared the Saemaul Undong to be the national program for rural development. This was later broadened to cover the urban sector, factories, and the military and to go beyond the village level. This period witnessed the creation of inter-village programs, sub-county projects, off-farm income and market enhancement, and the broadening of programs into environment improvement program, rural housing betterment, medical insurance, welfare assistance, and infrastructure improvements.

Structure. At the local level, the Saemaul organizational structure was considered an important innovation. Development projects, both internally initiated or externally induced, were organized and planned by the Village Development Committee and approved by the Village General Assembly.

The movement was consolidated through a Central Government Council for the Saemaul Undong installed in August 1971. The Council was composed of deputy ministers, thus facilitating inter-ministerial coordination. The Ministry of Home Affairs was charged to be the executive body of the Council. Similar structures were formed at local levels under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Bureau of Local Development was added to the Ministry. Specialized positions were opened such as those of Saemaul Officers and planning analysts. The membership of the Central Government Council was enlarged to include representatives from the private sector and nongovernmental organizations.

Because of the initiative and interest of President Park, the Saemaul movement had virtually direct lines throughout the bureaucracy all the way to the Office of the President. This was useful in shortcutting the bureaucratic process and providing the people direct access to the power structure. However, the situation could also limit people's participation for it was open to top-down abuse by the authorities (Ro 1993: 116).

(a)   Restructuring as an NGO

In 1979 following Park's assassination, the new president, Chun Do-Hwan, removed the Saemaul Undong from the government's formal structure

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and transformed it into a nongovernmental organization. In order "to maintain and further develop its democratic quality, its diversity, and its continuity" (Saemaul 1983: 45), the Office of the President relinquished the helm of the movement to the Saemaul Undong Headquarters. The Headquarters formed branches for the local management of the Saemaul Undong. However, government continued to infuse directly a substantial proportion of Saemaul's funding. The people's contribution at this point declined to as low as 31 percent of total cost of the movement (Ro 1993: 117) compared to the average of 71 percent from 1971 to 1978 (Whang 1986: 33).

(b)   Decline of the Movement

In 1987, almost ten percent of the South Korea population joined student demonstrations demanding a more democratic governance. Following a series of dramatic events, there was a peaceful transfer of power to Roh Tae Woo in February 1988. Along with Chun's retreat in disgrace, anything associated with the former regime was condemned, the Saemaul Undong among them. The Chairman of the movement was indicted for corruption and abuse of power and in 1988 was sentenced to prison. Nonetheless, the Saemaul Undong remains alive, although with much less prominence than before.

Impact of the Saemaul Undong (Turner *et al.* 1993; Whang 1986). After almost three decades of existence, Saemaul Undong managed to change the development landscape, particularly in rural Korea. Most of these are germane to a people-centered development.

(a)   Making Development Concrete

The Saemaul Undong has been credited with translating and concretizing the values of modernization from abstract concepts to visible projects directly related to people's daily lives and enjoyed by them. Equally important is that the development it engendered is both economic and social, as Bedeski (1994: 125) states, "no-nonsense more income and better living conditions" for the rural people.

(b)   Opening up the Villagers' Lives

The Saemaul Undong opened up the villages to the flow of information from the outside. This allowed people to see that material goods can be increased and progress can be made if they cooperated and subordinated their individual interests to the larger group. In turn, people became willing to volunteer to construct community infrastructure and experiment on new programs for their villages.

The exposure also broadened their horizons and increased their awareness of external processes. Villagers were found to have increasing

knowledge about the complexities of their situations, more critical of political institutions at various levels and more resentful of inequities. Although they were aroused to new forms of political activity, they became more cynical about their ability to affect political outcomes. Migration to urban areas may be significantly motivated by parents' strong inclination to send their children to big cities for better education (Turner *et al.* 1993).

(c)   Changing People's Attitudes

In assessing the relation between economic well-being and people's pattern of attitude and behavior, Turner *et al.* (1993) found that in the villages with high income gain through the Saemaul Undong, people's individualistic tendencies significantly decreased. Strength of their cooperative attitude and group behavior remained steady while political self-confidence and participation increased. Personal efficacy, aversion of risk, and entrepreneurship remained the same.

However, in villages with low and intermediate economic gain, individualism increased while scores in cooperation diminished. Their political self-confidence was unchanged while political activism decreased.

(d)   Narrowing the Rural-Urban Disparity

Saemaul Undong contributed to the equalization of rural-urban income by increasing villagers' monetary resources. This was achieved through the visible and considerable amount of infrastructure development; improved living conditions; and advancement of education and health.

At the beginning of Saemaul, the disparity of household incomes between urban laborers and rural farmers was at 0.67. During the first decade of the movement, the rural-urban incomes almost equalized. In the mid-1970s, the farm household income even exceeded that of the urban laborer at a high of 1.04; it then slowed down to settle at 0.85 towards the 1980s. Whang (1984) warns that the phenomenon could not be scientifically attributed to Saemaul Undong alone but to other factors such as higher rice price policy and the green revolution. Nevertheless, there is a fairly acceptable chance that the income of the rural sector will increase, thus closing the gap, due to improved access to better seeds, more farm to market roads and post-harvest facilities, and opening up of markets, factors that were closely related to activities of Saemaul Undong movement.

(e)   Creating a More Responsive and Decentralized Governance

Saemaul Undong might also be partly credited with making the local government less bureaucratic. Some attributed this particular phenomenon to

the Saemaul Training that had government officials living and training together with people from all walks of life. These occasions helped open the eyes of high civil servants to "a greater understanding of the concern and interest of the country as a whole" (Kim and Leipziger 1993: 31).

The movement also had impact on the decentralization of governance. The assumption was made that even if general directions and externally originated human and material resources were blueprinted by the central government, the role of local governments in "defining the scope and nature of Saemaul Undong's projects at the community level, as well as their achievements" remains significant (Caiden and Kim 1991: 184).

(f) People's Participation

Against the backdrop of Korea's authoritarian environment throughout its life, the Saemaul Undong movement was bound to impose "patrimonially paternal programs" even more than its predecessors (Jacobs 1985: 109). Nevertheless, its practice of organizing village people and installing a local organizational structure side by side with the governance structure proved an alternative channel for people's participation (Whang 1986). Moreover, it was found that local people increased attempts to influence local decisionmaking (Turner et al. 1993).

Thus, despite the authoritarian environment during the time, the Saemaul movement was able to shape and generate a uniquely South Korean people's participation. This occurred not so much at the national or regional levels, but at the local levels where the movement instilled democratic principles and practices so the villagers had the opportunity to run their own villages' affairs and increase their planning capabilities (Saemaul 1983: 28). People's political self-confidence and participation increased so that "they had more opportunity to control their destiny under the Saemaul Undong movement than at any other point in Korean history" (Steinberg 1993: 149).

Noteworthy is the finding that the Saemaul Undong has made women and the young play more active roles in community affairs. This becomes significant when situated in the context of the strongly Confucian traits of the society.

(g) Developing Leadership

Saemaul leaders at the village levels, who worked side by side with village heads, tended to originate from the local village, be younger than the average village dwellers, be more educated and more affluent, have more social mobility and exposure to modern organizations. Saemaul leaders were typically young and ambitious. They tended to carry out development projects

in a democratic manner while maintaining smooth relationship with village heads. In more progressive villages, they may have played more important roles than the village heads (Ro 1993: 116). Saemaul leaders also instilled democratic principles (Whang 1986: 89; Dore and Mars 1981: 70).

(h)   Improvement of Human Capital

During the 1960s, Korea's mode of development necessitated importation of industrial technologies critical for sustaining its economic growth. However, the country then did not have adequate human capital to keep up with the technological demands of economic growth. The Saemaul Undong movement was considered important in improving the human capital and thus was able to balance the importation and the development of scientific know-how and technology, and to rediscover how to motivate people for participating in the new technological developments (Jin 1991).

Kaunlaran Sa Pagkakaisa Program (Philippines)

Bulacan abuts Metropolitan Manila and is considered one of the most progressive local jurisdictions of the Philippines. In 1994, it posted the highest average family income among all the provinces, ₱7,869 per month, ₱2,406 higher than the national average (Monterola 1994: E-6). This was an increase of 126 percent over 1985. Poverty incidence is recorded at 17.9 percent, the lowest among first class provinces (*Innovations* 1994: 27). Crime incidence at seven per 100,000 population compares favorably with the national mean of twelve (Padilla 1995b: B-18).

Although Bulacan is a first class province based on its income, most of its 24 municipalities are poor. Only one is a second class municipality, eight are third class, and the remaining fifteen are in the lowest categories (fourth to sixth). Clearly Bulacan has much room for improvement.

Bulacan Governor Roberto Pagdanganan, who is also president of the League of Governors of the Philippines, calls cooperatives as "the harbingers of countryside development" (Pagdanganan 1995: B-6), and considers as one of his major accomplishments "the meteoric rise of cooperativism in Bulacan" (quoted in Padilla 1995b: B-18).

When Pagdanganan assumed office in 1986, Bulacan had 52 cooperatives, up from six in 1975 (*Manila Bulletin*, 2 December 1995: 19). One of his first acts as governor was to create the Kaunlaran sa Pagkakaisa[3] Program (KPP) to develop cooperativism in his province. With the KPP's support, the number of cooperatives grew to 767 in 1993, the year it won for the province an award for excellence in local governance. As of November 1995, Bulacan had 879

cooperatives with total assets of ₱1.5 billion. The Cooperative Development Authority, the government agency regulating cooperatives, called it "the most outstanding province in the country" in 1995 (Padilla 1995: C8).

The robust growth of cooperatives in Bulacan is surprising in a nation where cooperativism has had a checkered career. In 1952, the government created the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) to promote and assist cooperatives. By 1960, David Wurfel had appraised them as

> ... an extension of the arena of competition for local elites; their membership was too dispersed geographically and too varied economically to have a sense of solidarity.... [T]he greater the role of ACCFA representatives in the extension and collection of loans, the greater the reinforcement of the popular attitude that this was bounty from that distant benefactor, the government (quoted in Rocamora and Panganiban 1975: 76-77).

Worse, Orlando Sacay, a Filipino expert on cooperativism, found that those with farms below three hectares and with no collateral—73 percent of farms—got only 1.5 percent of total production credit (Rocamora and Panganiban 1975: 78).

One of Sacay's remedies was to create *samahang nayons* (SN, literally, village associations) so that cooperatives would be formed by neighbors who trust each other. Mandated under Martial Law, SNs quickly proliferated. But only 42 percent of 17,115 SNs registered in the Bureau of Cooperatives Development as of January 1986 were still active twelve months later (Legaspi 1990: 29).

Yet there are hopeful signs. The Cooperative Foundation Philippines, Inc. studied 8,185 cooperatives in 1989 and found that based on several financial indicators, the co-op movement is robust (Gaffud 1995: 35). Indeed, Gaffud sees "a rising trend toward self-help... [that] could outgrow the effects of government's haunting shadow over cooperatives that linger from the 'officialization' of cooperatives in the past."

State-Cooperative Relationship. The Philippines is the only country out of the nine which ANGOC (1995: 22) studied with a policy environment described as "supportive." The Philippine Constitution of 1987 encourages nongovernmental, community-based or sectoral organizations promoting the country's welfare (Article II, Section 23). It further recognizes "the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests." It guarantees "the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision making" (Article III, Sections 15 and 16). These provisions may be expected in

a state where "people power" toppled a dictator. Also, NGOs dramatically increased in the 1970s as a reaction against state repression during Marcos' regime.

These provisions have been operationalized in many ways. Practically every government agency now has an NGO desk through which it interacts with civil society organizations. This linkage has "transformed the bureaucracy" in some situations (see, e.g., Korten and Siy 1988) but are simple window-dressing mechanisms in others.

Among the nongovernment groups are cooperatives which stand between the private sector and non-profit associations as a type. Similar to business firms in that they primarily aim to gain profit for their member-owners, they are like NGOs in their agenda of self-reliance. Cooperatives are self-help promotion strategies where people with similar economic roles (e.g., farmers or consumers) or common residence band together for "better bargaining leverage in the market and improved claim-taking abilities over public resources" (Gaffud 1995: 1). The attainment of these twin aims is hampered because their members generally come from marginalized groups and they have to compete with private enterprises which may have clout derived both from their standing in the market, and political and family connections. State intervention may protect them, but the appropriate dose of regulation and provision of facilities has proven difficult to find. As Gaffud (1995: 3) says:

> Government support ... can stunt the growth of self-help initiatives when its provision becomes overbearing. At the same time, too little support may only raise undue expectations without producing any substantive effect.

In the past, the government was very active in organizing cooperatives and in providing loans to help start off fledgling organizations. This had resulted in too many groups being hastily organized so that they could receive government assistance, but which did not have the management skills and commitment to make the effort succeed.

The current Cooperative Code (Republic Act No. 6938) is more circumspect about its role. It assigns the organization of cooperatives to the private sector under the principle of subsidiarity. Government is expected to play a secondary role, providing assistance only when necessary and requested. It has thus enjoined itself to respect the autonomy and integrity of cooperatives.

The Local Government Code of 1991 gives a key role to people's organizations and enterprises, specifically including cooperatives, in the achievement of self-reliance at the grassroots. To that end, it calls upon local government units to promote these organizations and to consider them

partners in local autonomy and development. Local governments are enjoined to utilize cooperatives for agricultural extension and on-site research and to give them preferential right in the operation of public utilities. Hence, instead of just choosing to work with established cooperatives, a few provincial governments have chosen to include the promotion, creation and strengthening of cooperatives among their programs under their general welfare powers.

The Cooperative Structure in Bulacan. As of 1995, Bulacan had 879 primary cooperatives, six federations or secondary cooperatives at the provincial level and a union of these federations, also at the provincial level. The primary cooperatives are credit, consumer, marketing, agriculture and multipurpose co-ops. Spearheads for their formation are as varied as their membership. For instance, the San Pablo Apostol *Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi*, Inc. was organized in 1986 on the initiative of the parish priest and ten parochial leaders distressed at the dependence of his flock on usurers. The Countryside Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (CMPCI) was begun in 1990 by a group of former rebels who found that their return to the fold of the law did not open access to agricultural credit. Credit problems were also the reason for organizing the Ligas *Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi*, Inc. (LKBPI) which started as a couples' group under the romantic name Everlasting Club.

The Malipampang Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (MMPCI) started as a *samahang nayon*. Although formally instituted in 1973, it had no business activity until 1990. The Kaypian Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. was founded by twelve neighbors so that they can procure farm inputs and consumer goods (Gaffud 1995: 272-88).

The federations vary in terms of the type of co-ops under them. The strongest secondary co-ops are the *Katipunang Yaman ng mga Kapisanang Tangkilikan* or *Katangkilik*, and the Bulacan Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. The other four are newly organized. Katangkilik, set up in 1988, has 38 member-primaries including the cooperatives of Malipampang, Kaypian and the former rebels. Most have incorporated as multipurpose cooperatives although the bulk of their activities are in agriculture.

Despite its name, 20 percent of the 72 in the roster of the Bulacan Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. (BFCCI) are multipurpose organizations, including that of Ligas and San Pablo Apostol. BFCCI also counts at least two members as "millionaire cooperatives." BFCCI was also organized in 1988, with officials of the then Bureau of Cooperative Development assisting in setting it up.

The *Kalipunan ng mga Kooperatiba sa Bulacan* (KKB), the Provincial Cooperative Union, is the apex organization of Bulacan cooperatives, with

four federations and 100 primaries among its members. It was approved as a union by the Bureau of Cooperative Development in 1985. The need for a union arose from demands of co-op leaders for continuing education and training for the organizations and their members. KKB also undertakes research for its members.

In the 1995 regional cooperative conference, Bulacan co-ops won all the major awards: as the most outstanding federation, and the most outstanding primary cooperatives for both the agricultural and non-agricultural categories (*Manila Bulletin*, 17 March 1995: 34).

The *Kaunlaran sa Pagkakaisa Program (KPP)*. Although the promotion of cooperatives is a national government function, Bulacan launched the KPP as a provincial program to respond to the demand of farmer-leaders for such assistance in a series of consultations held in 1986 (Joaquin 1996; Gaffud 1995: 108-09). Billed by its governor as "the economic operationalization of the spirit of trust," the program has the following objectives:

- To mobilize rural savings to create capital for economic activities;

- To inculcate the virtues of credit worthiness and economic nationalism among the people;

- To develop cooperatives as a mechanism for achieving self-reliant and economically progressive rural communities in the province; and

- To assist in the establishment of small- and medium-scale economic projects (quoted from Joaquin 1996: 1-2).

The "strategic thrust" of cooperative development in Bulacan is the creation of a strong middle class that will be the core of the local citizenry (Gaffud 1995: 58).

KPP is managed and supervised by the Provincial Cooperative and Entrepreneurial Development Office (PCEDO) headed by a former head of the province's cooperative union (Gaffud 1995: 98). PCEDO is directly under the Governor.

KPP is funded yearly with one million pesos from the Provincial Development Fund, augmented by repayments of loans remitted into a trust fund (Gaffud 1995: 106). In the 1994 Annual Investment Plan, ₱500,000 was set aside for cooperatives education, ₱300,000 for project development and ₱1.5 million for KPP (Gaffud 1995: 109).

KPP provides facilities in the form of training and access to cheap credit, markets, and technology. Training for co-op leaders and managers has been undertaken in such areas as pre-membership orientation, co-op production management, financial management, and general co-op management. Training programs do not focus only on technical topics, but are infused also with value messages such as credit worthiness, industry, resourcefulness and entrepreneurship (Joaquin 1996: 4).

KPP serves as a conduit for credit from various sources for easier access by co-ops and other organized groups. To identify who could qualify for credit financing up to ₱50,000, PCEDO reviews a cooperative's system of savings and capital build-up, management, and leadership capabilities. Co-ops have to put up a counterpart for half of the loan sought (Joaquin 1996: 3).

Besides co-op development, KPP has also been involved in projects on environmental protection and management. They include: tree-planting and cleanliness, waste management, dredging of creeks, resuscitation of dying rivers and implementation of rules and regulations governing the use of natural resources and the prevention of pollution (*Innovations* 1993: 27).

KPP-Co-op Relations. KPP has supported the co-op movement by strengthening the cooperatives individually or through their federations. Katangkilik is authorized to recommend cooperatives applying for loans through the KPP and to receive payments *on* behalf of the provincial government. In addition, affiliates of Katangkilik may benefit from a credit scheme with the guarantee of the provincial government.

Cooperatives are now represented in consultative and policy bodies. Co-op leaders have priority seats in the Provincial Development Council (PDC), a government/NGO council chaired by the governor and composed of his cabinet, other provincial political leaders and representatives of leading NGOs (Joaquin 1996: 4). The chairperson of Katangkilik also serves as the presiding officer of *Sangguniang Magsasaka* (Farmers' Council), the consultative body on agriculture where many other co-op leaders also sit (Gaffud 1995: 102). Member-primaries may also voice their policy positions to Katangkilik for submission to Sangguniang Magsasaka (Gaffud 1995:159).

PCEDO was also credited by cooperatives for coordination of inter-agency programs on co-ops, micro-enterprise lending, working capital loans for federations, commodity grants for post-harvest facilities, financial and facilities support to cooperative education, and livelihood development projects (Gaffud 1995: 160).

Katangkilik has undertaken national infrastructure projects upon representations of the Bulacan governor. One of these was the construction of

34 schoolbuildings in 1990 and 1991, proceeds from the earnings of which were used to start up the Agro-Food Processing and Development Corporation. Government also assisted Katangkilik by assigning a staff member of the PCEDO to it to handle day-to-day operations, since the co-op has no full-time employee (Gaffud 1995: 233).

BFCCI, meanwhile, received a commodity grant from the Bulacan government for the construction of its office building. Kalipunan received assistance in training and coordination of its activities with primary and secondary co-ops (Gaffud 1995: 99-100).

Indeed, the provincial government has been well-appreciated by cooperatives for the variety of assistance it has provided. Among those they mentioned specifically are the following: "(1) policy recognition and political support; (2) coordination of inter-agency programs and projects for cooperative development through the recently started Project Shared Responsibility; (3) start-up loans for incipient cooperatives; (4) working capital loan for Katangkilik; (5) commodity grant for construction of BFFCI's building; (6) financial and facilities support to training and cooperative education activities; (7) livelihood development projects; and (8) guarantee counterpart in the GAIN program" (Gaffud 1995: 113).

In interviews Gaffud made, cooperative leaders were also grateful that the governor had not used cooperatives for political ends (Gaffud 1995: 100). They likewise found the provincial government highly supportive of their work, "in contrast to reservations about unions' helpfulness to primaries" (Gaffud 1995: 159).

Cooperatives development is not the KPP's, or Bulacan's, baby alone. The Department of Trade and Industry has conducted training programs for KPP clients, found markets for products made by co-ops, and provided technical assistance in program development and operation. Financial and technical assistance has also been provided by other national agencies like the Departments of Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, Environment and Natural Resources, and the Interior and Local Government; the Cooperatives Development Authority; the Land Bank of the Philippines and the National Manpower and Youth Council (*Innovations* 1995: 25).

Nor does support come solely from the public sector. Some seven foundations from the private sector and the NGO community have also provided funds and technical assistance to KPP (Joaquin 1996: 2-3).

Results of KPP Actions. From 1986 to 1993, KPP extended assistance to 13,107 direct beneficiaries, lent ₱13.604 million to co-ops, and produced earnings of ₱33,329 for each member-family (*Innovations* 1995: 27). The last

must be appreciated against the fact that the average Bulacan family income in 1994 was ₱7,869.

As much as ₱657.8 million in rural savings have been mobilized in 1994 alone. Meanwhile, the credit cooperatives lent ₱3.5 billion to over 200,000 beneficiaries. Loans were applied for production (₱2.5 billion), emergency loans (₱94 million) and education, housing, medical and household purposes (₱925 million) (Joaquin 1996: 7). KPP's policy of extending loans based on strict rules has been vindicated: as of the end of 1987, all six cooperatives that borrowed in November 1986 had paid in full (Joaquin 1996: 3).

For their part, total assets of cooperatives rose from ₱24.2 million in 1986 to ₱1.1 billion in 1993. These were ploughed back to their members through production loans (₱2.5 million), providential loans for education, housing, health and appliance purchase (₱925 million), and emergency loans (₱94 million) (*Innovations* 1993: 27).

Women are among KPP's key beneficiaries. KPP helped to create and promote 26 registered women's cooperatives for credit, consumer, marketing, production and other purposes. There are also nine KPP-funded women's co-ops dealing in garments, toys, noodles, hogs and other consumption goods (*Innovations* 1993: 28).

Small- and medium-scale enterprises have also been created and strengthened through project identification and packaging, installation of needed technologies, financing and management systems, and other types of technical assistance, including generating funds and savings mobilization. (*Innovations* 1993; Joaquin 1996: 4).

The Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya (Sri Lanka)

The *Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya* (Sarvodaya Movement), arguably the biggest NGO in Sri Lanka, has received several awards for itself and for its founder, Dr. A.T. Ariyaratne.[4] Cultivating the Buddhist philosophy combining moral revival and concrete community development, the Sarvodaya movement has gone through peaks and valleys in its relationship with the state throughout its almost forty years of existence.

Genesis. The Sarvodaya movement began in 1958 when Ariyaratne, a science teacher, determined to show that directly serving the people would give valuable insights on a par with classroom learning (Perera *et al.* 1992: 138). He reacted against the development concept which was "an elitist exercise that has pushed common people to an increasing state of dependency and nonparticipation in the decisionmaking processes that affect their lives" (Ariyaratne 1986: 32).

Ariyaratne organized the Social Service League and initiated "*shramadana*"[5] work camps to complement classroom learning and introduce a new way of life (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 41). It immediately attracted thousands of students, teachers and other people (Garilao and Associates 1991: 55).

In 1961, the government formed a similar program under the name Shramadana Movement. To maintain his organization's integrity, Ariyaratne added "*Sarvodaya*," a term meaning "the welfare or the awakening of all" to its name.[6]

Vision and Principles. Sarvodaya is anchored on Buddhist principles (Perera *et al.* 1992: 12) and envisions transforming Sri Lanka—and the whole world—into a Sarvodaya Society (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 3). Sri Lanka would be "a commonwealth of village republics" where each village would be autonomous enough to be self-sufficient (Approtech 1991: 68). In providing for their own, the people and not the government will build a "welfare society" (not a welfare state). That decentralized society will have neither affluence nor poverty, and will blend the latest scientific advances with traditional wisdom. It will eschew the "Western emphasis on exploitation of scarce resources, profit-maximising technologies, and use of commercial means to satisfy greed that results in the affluence of a small section of the world and in the poverty and powerlessness of the vast majority" (Perera *et al.* 1992: 138-151).

Key elements of development according to the Sarvodaya are harmonious integration of people's spiritual, moral, cultural, social, economic, and political participation; involvement of all sectors of the population; and emphasis on self-reliance, self-discipline, self-help, and community participation. It stresses a development that would foster the "right environment" (preserving the life support system); "right livelihood" (improving existing lifestyles and livelihood that contribute to the quality of life); "right values" (nurturing the traditional value system to give spiritual meaning to lives); human rights; people's power and freedom of the media; and upholding the supremacy of just law and impartial justice (Perera *et al.* 1992: 150-51).

Strategies. The Sarvodaya strategies are as follows:

- Reawakening through non-violent transformation of human being and society;

- Sharing one's time, thoughts and effort as a way of life;

- Non-confrontation with the government;

*   Transformation of the village from the village itself;

*   Training and education;

*   Building on already existing traditional leadership;

*   Identifying basic human needs; and

*   Assisting the poorest sectors of the community (Ratnapala and
     Gunasekara 1984: 41-46; Perera *et al.* 1992: 138-151).

Sarvodaya targets villages that are inaccessible and isolated, under-
privileged, lacking in health, educational and other social amenities and have
unique social, economic and cultural problems (Ratnapala and Gunasekara
1984: 42). In each village, it implements its strategies in five development
stages: (1) the introductory stage; (2) the group formation stage when it
organizes groups to directly respond to immediate concerns of the village and
sends identified potential leaders for training; (3) the need satisfaction stage
when the Sarvodaya Shramadana Society is organized, registered with the
government and is able to identify and set plans to meet the basic needs of the
village; (4) the self-financing stage when the village organization is able to
mobilize local resources; and (5) the surplus stage, when a village is able to
extend assistance to other villages (ANGOC 1992).

As of 1994, Stage 1 Sarvodaya villages numbered 604, Stage 2 were 619,
Stage 3, 777 and Stage 4, 273.   Hardly any village ever reaches the last
developmental stage (Sarvodaya 1993-94: viii).

Programs. In 1993-94, Sarvodaya had the following major programs:

*   Poverty eradication and empowerment of the poor, undertaken in
     2,273 villages. The whole package of 9,679 projects costs Rs. 9.3
     million.

*   Early child development, encompassing 4,754 children's groups,
     and 2,776 mother's groups engaged in a nutritional program in 300
     pre-schools. Of the total cost of Rs. 5.5 million, more than half was
     contributed by the villages.

*   Sarvodaya rural technical services, such as provision of sanitation,
     housing and gravity water supply of which 45 percent of
     construction cost came from the beneficiaries.

- Financial assistance to self-employment enterprises of as much as Rs. 217.6 million in soft loans.

- 109 management training programs in three centers, provided for its own workers and outsiders.

- Rural enterprise development, involving training and expert instruction for 7,139 farmers in 206 farmers' groups.

- "Elders action committee," found in 2,053 villages, dedicated to the promotion of peaceful co-existence among different ethnic communities.

- "Relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation and reawakening," supplying essential needs of pre-schools, carried out in 11 districts and 68 regional centers (Sarvodaya 1993-94).

Sarvodaya also has units focused on women, drug addicts, minor offenders, the handicapped, youth, and human rights victims. It also has a savings scheme, a development education center, a section for international visitors, Sunday school teaching and meditation classes, a library and an audio-visual section (Sarvodaya 1993-94).

Organizational Structure. The Sarvodaya Movement enjoys a decentralized structure and has organizations at the village, gramodaya, division, district and national levels. All village organizations, along with the Headquarters formally register with the government (Garilao and Associates 1991: 63-64).

Trained voluntary workers attend to and facilitate the interests of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Society in the villages. Trained paid workers serve at all the other levels. Serving as the integrating association of the national organizations of youth, mothers, etc., the Sarvodaya Shramadana Headquarters has an Executive Council of 57 elected members, assisted by a committee of officials comprising the Headquarters and district-level administrators. The Headquarters consist of: (1) The Program Division which promotes projects and activities, (2) the Research Institute, and (3) the Shanti Seva (Peace Corps) (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984).

NGOs and the State. NGOs in Sri Lanka started to emerge in the late 1960s and increased in number tremendously in the late 1970s, probably as a result of the opening up of the economy and the influx of foreign aid (Sarvodaya 1993-94: 43). Government began regulating NGOs in 1961; it installed a voluntary registration scheme for NGOs seeking legal status, under

which the government must approve the NGO's constitution, dissolve it and appoint or dismiss NGO board members. NGOs were required to submit an annual report by 1978. The Social Service Organization Act (1981), the Trust Act with Public Trustees and the Company Act (both 1982) required registration for groups seeking legal status. Laws were passed in 1983 authorizing government to monitor and audit accounts and in 1988 to review the budgets of NGOs. "With the consent of the NGOs," the government also promulgated the Voluntary Organization Act to regulate the sector (1981) (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 64). The Gramodaya Act (1987) set parameters to the participation of representatives of people's and nongovernmental organizations in village development councils. Laws passed between 1978 and 1988 centered on regulating the acceptance and use of foreign aid (ANGOC 1995; Sarvodaya various years; Perera *et al.* 1992).

In 1989, the Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation made a study of the role of the NGO and GO-NGO relationship. Based on it, the government created the NGOs Commission which embodied the strictest regulations to date (Perera *et al.* 1992). Over time, its implementation moved from strictness to a more amicable *modus vivendi* with the civil society organizations. According to the Asian NGO Council, Sri Lanka's general policy relative to NGOs is "regulative" in that it allows NGOs the exercise of basic freedoms while setting parameters for NGO activities (ANGOC 1995: 22).

Sarvodaya-State Relationship. Ariyaratne views the Sarvodaya-state relationship as *"kalyana mithraya"* (a good friendship) which is "both critical and discerning for the sake of the other" (Sarvodaya 1990-1991: 69). That the NGO may hold views different from the official one is seen to be a democratic feature. Sarvodaya sees the necessity of working with the government bureaucracy. However, it strictly observes the principle of non-participation in party politics. Instead, it wants "to train the top to come down to the people's level" (Perera *et al.* 1992: 90) and makes every effort to induce the government, political parties and the general public to join its movement (Sarvodaya 1990-1991: 69, 75).

In principle, the Sarvodaya Movement regards the government as representing the interests of the public and as creating the atmosphere whereby those interests can be guaranteed and fulfilled. Meanwhile, the NGOs can be involved in the grassroots in many ways not possible for the government, i.e., on the community's terms. Therefore it is imperative that GOs and NGOs meet, discuss, and work together (Perera *et al.* 1992).

However, the State-Sarvodaya relationship has varied over time. Strains were most evident between 1970 and 1977 (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984; Wanashinghe 1985) and again between 1989 and 1992 (Perera *et al.* 1992). These situations appear to be related to both the internal problems of Sri

Lanka with separatism and the perceived pressure exerted by foreign agencies funding Sarvodaya.

Early on, as already stated, Sarvodaya served as a model for later government undertakings. For instance, the government accepted the idea that eventually, Sri Lanka would be a commonwealth of independent village republics. It also adopted the term "Shramadana" and its program in 1961 (Perera *et al.* 1992: 139). Government has been a consumer of Sarvodaya goods, services and innovations throughout its life. The Electricity Board adopted its fuel conservation stoves, and the relevant agencies adopted its leaf porridge nutrition, social forestry, training and drug rehabilitation programs (Perera *et al.* 1992: 90-91).

In 1977, the United National Party took power, assumed a moderate center-of-the-road economic stance and sought to establish a minimalist and non-interventionist state (Baxter *et al.* 1987: 329). During this period, Sarvodaya enjoyed special status as an organization the state viewed as having the capacity of motivating and conscientizing the rural folks (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 52-53). It accepted to work with multi-ethnic communities where the state had constrained access.

The government asked Sarvodaya to be "at the forefront of rehabilitation and reconciliation work during the racial strife." It invited the Sarvodaya to jointly set up the *Udyagama* Program or model housing program for *Rodiyas*, a low caste and shunned people. By 1984, 160 villages had already benefited from this partnership where the government provides land and materials while Sarvodaya motivates the people to undertake the construction (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 90, 25-27).

Another collaborative program was the Hambatota Integrated Rural Development Project (HIRDEP) that included the restoration of abandoned irrigation tanks, land development, construction of essential social and economic infrastructure and the settlement of almost a thousand landless families. The Sarvodaya was entrusted to undertake the community development portion of the project, and later also the housing assistance scheme (IDSS 1989: 433). All these activities resulted in Sarvodaya's enjoying a large measure of protection from the state and militants alike during that period (Garilao and Associates 1991: 63, 67).

Wanashinghe (1985: 240) characterized this period as "the guidance role of the public sector increasingly taking on a facilitative character and its direct share in economic activities progressively dwindling with the earlier state management of economic enterprise being, in actual fact, dismantled." The International Development Support Services (IDSS) explains the change in this way:

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> The accession to power in 1977 of a government which believed in the efficacy of private enterprise and a partnership with the voluntary or non-government sector, was the springboard for this development (IDSS 1989: 428).

Give-and-take marked the government-Sarvodaya partnership in training. From one perspective, Sarvodaya served the State by taking in government officials for training. Yet the programs also became an occasion to acquaint government officers with the objectives and workings of the NGO. After they were back on the job, civil servants and political officials kept in touch with Sarvodaya activities through refresher classes. This mutually beneficial cooperation took place at all levels. Sarvodaya and the government also shared research findings (Ratnapala and Gunasekara 1984: 58).

The relationship has not been all rosy. With the installation of the NGOs Commission in 1989, most NGOs including the Sarvodaya suffered. Probably due to the magnitude of Sarvodaya's foreign donors, the government made a thinly veiled accusation that it was channelling foreign funds to a Sri Lanka separatist group. The allegation went on to accuse the movement of endorsing the opposition party. For its part, Sarvodaya complained about rigorous investigations by the NGO Commission, systematic defamation through the media, withholding of bank loans, and freezing of foreign-originated funds (Sarvodaya 1990-1991). It also denounced the harassment of the president of the Sarvodaya movement and his family (Perera *et al.* 1992: 184).

The escalating state pressure put Sarvodaya to the test. It pledged

> in the first instance ... [to] bear injustice with patience, then ... to educate and uplift the awareness of those wronged to seek justice from the court, and to awaken the power of the people. If the strain remained unresolved, the movement would join together with all other nonviolent and democratic forces and change the power political system (Sarvodaya 1990-91: 65-66).

The resolution of the problem was reported by Sarvodaya as follows:

> The 30th June (1993) was a memorable day for us. It marked the removal of all impediments cast on us by government. It not only provided us with an opportunity to recap on losses but also it gave us a fresh impetus to carry out our achievements with a greater sense of conviction and devotion. We are grateful to His Excellency President D.B. Wijetunge, former president, for action taken by him in removing all such hindrance by issue of a single circular (Sarvodaya 1993-94: vii).

The extent of government support since then can be gleaned from the following figures:

> Rs. 1.11 million provided by the State for Divisional Development Program out of a total Rs. 9.5 million,

Rs. 648,00 of Rs. 1.8 million provided for the programs of the elders
action committee,
13.8 % of the resources for Shramadana camp at the national level,
58.1 % for Shramadana camp at the gramadana level,
50.3 % for Regional Action Committees, and
3.1 % for regional cultural and sports program.

It should be noted that in most cases, the bulk of the funds was raised from
the villagers themselves (Sarvodaya 1993-94: 19-20). Meanwhile, as of 1995,
all 2,235 Sarvodaya Shramadana Societies[7] have registered with the
government.

Sarvodaya has reached all sectors of the multi-racial, multi-religious, and
multi-lingual Sri Lankan society. In 1992, it was in more than 8,000 villages
and had 3,000 full-time workers, 4,000 village volunteers, and 12,000 officers
in more than 4,000 village societies (Perera *et al.* 1992). Indeed, the Niwano
Peace Foundation of Japan may not be engaging in hyperbole when it called
the Sarvodaya as "the world's largest citizen-led movement conducted by an
NGO." The reception the Sri Lankan society has accorded it suggests the
efficacy of its principles which combined Buddhist ideas, traditional practices
and modern social technologies of training and innovation. The Sarvodaya
movement has also managed to fund its vast programs with international
support which, correctly, did not overwhelm the internal contributions from
Sri Lankan society and the communities themselves.

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)

Bangladesh used to be part of the British Raj in the Indian subcontinent,
and from 1947 to 1971 was known as East Pakistan. After a devastating nine-
month War of Liberation, Bangladesh became a new state with a daunting set
of development problems. It remains one of the most densely populated and
poorest countries of Asia and the world.

Bangladesh had tasted an alternation of parliamentary and military rule.
Since 1990, it has been attempting to live under a democratic framework
following the resignation of military leader President Ershad. Many NGOs
claim a role in the opposition and resistance that forced his resignation.

Nongovernmental Organizations in Bangladesh. Voluntarism in
Bangladesh started out as charity work conducted by altruistic land-owning
families or by Christian missionaries. Immediately after Independence, NGOs
delivered relief and rehabilitation services and gradually took on a more
development-oriented character. The indigenous NGO sector tends to follow a
bottom-up notion of development and works through primary people's groups.
Bangladeshi organizations at the grassroots remain affiliated with the NGOs

that created them, instead of evolving into separate people's organizations. Bangladesh had over 12,000 registered NGOs as of June 1990 (Khan 1991: 131) but many of them are small, ineffective and local. Development-oriented NGOs are only slightly over 250 (IDSS 1989: 4).

State-NGO Relations. The first law to regulate charitable societies was promulgated in 1860 (IDSS 1989). A century later, Pakistan passed the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) Ordinance 1961 which required all NGOs to register with the Directorate of Social Welfare which could also approve their constitution, inspect books of accounts and other records, and suspend or dissolve the NGO (Khan 1991: 131; ANGOC 1995: 20). The first regulation of the Government of Bangladesh came in 1978 when it required the Ministry of Finance to clear all foreign donations to voluntary activities (IDSS 1989). Lewis (1993: 53) maintains that this subjected NGOs to red tape and led to corruption and abandonment of programs by small NGOs. From the government perspective, Khan (1991: 136) explains the requirement as serving the values of "complementarity, accountability, transparency and cost-effectiveness of NGO programs."

In 1989, an NGO Affairs Bureau under the Cabinet Division put together the functions of all agencies regulating or monitoring NGOs. While government justifies this as a means of speeding up processing by specialists in NGO activities (Khan 1991: 132), some NGOs regard this as improving the government's ability to monitor them (Lewis 1993: 53). This has led the Asian NGO Council (1995) to classify Bangladesh's relations with NGOs as "restrictive." Indeed spokespersons of both state and civil society concede that the legal framework builds a relationship of mutual distrust even as both recognize their potential complementarity (Khan 1991: 132-34; Lewis 1993: 53-55).

A source of tension in the GO-NGO relationship has to do with differing ideas on what is development, with the state expecting NGOs to fit into its development framework when many organizations regard it as elitist and not sufficiently concerned with poverty alleviation and popular empowerment. In turn, that interpretation is related to the practice of some NGOs of distancing themselves from government to maintain credibility with clients and donors. The government criticizes NGO claims to be legitimate representatives of the people citing their poor reach (not more than 20 percent of the population) and thus, possibly overstated impact, and the possibility that they may only be substituting elite patronage with their own (Lewis 1993; Khan 1991). Nevertheless, both sides have found collaboration in service delivery worthwhile.

The role of NGOs in the Five-Year Plans has broadened over time. The First Plan (1973-78) limited NGOs only to the social welfare sector.

Government financial support was declared kept "at a minimum and ... granted only where justified by actual performance and real need." That stricture aimed "to curb the growth of mushroom organizations, create the concept of self-help in the community and generate a willingness and sense of social service in the workers and organizations" (IDSS 1989: 16).

The Third Plan (1985-90) was more encouraging of NGOs, particularly those in health, family planning and women's development. In 1988, the Cabinet encouraged NGO activities as long as they were "not detrimental to government policy or national security." However, it allowed NGOs to undertake projects included in the Plan and told public agencies to give assistance for their smooth implementation (IDSS 1989: 17).

The Fourth Plan (1990-95), according to Khan (1991: 136) "has adequately recognized the importance and contributions of NGOs and seek to utilize their services in a more cost-effective and coordinated way." NGOs are to supplement the Plan's thrust towards decentralized participatory planning at the upazila (subdistrict) levels. Meanwhile, ministries were required to restructure their poverty-related programs and to set regional targets with NGOs. The trend appears to be towards a more supportive, enabling policy environment. Specifics of the state-NGO relations are explored in the following case study of the largest NGO in the country.

The Program of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) was founded in 1972 shortly after the War of Liberation from Pakistan. It is reputedly "one of the more highly regarded development oriented NGOs in Asia" (IDSS 1989: 22). Starting as the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee assisting war refugees, it soon embraced the objective of long-term development focused on poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor. The BRAC philosophy takes "the people as the subject and the different sectors as the object" of development (Mustafa, Rahman and Sattar 1993: 78). Conscientization and critical consciousness accompany providing the communities with occupational and managerial skills. Its empowerment strategy is defined "as the ability of the landless to press demands and resolve conflicts in their favor; and the capacity to create new wealth through the productive use of resource gained" (Luz 1991: 124).

The program foci of BRAC are diverse, including human and organizational development, employment and income generation, health care (Mustafa *et al.* 1993), program support infrastructure, primary health care, primary education, reading and libraries, population control and social security and emergency relief (Luz 1991), irrigation, fisheries, social forestry, micro-enterprises, credit, development research and documentation, training, and integrated and multisectoral programs cutting across those fields (IDSS 1989).

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Programs tend to be maintained and improved over several years. For instance, four programs operational in 1988 had been in existence for at least ten years.[8]

Its concern for the people has remained constant over time; BRAC has always targetted the poor, the landless and the women, these qualities merging in most of the groups assisted (Mustafa *et al.* 1993; IDSS 1989; Khan 1991; Khanna 1984).[9] In choosing them, BRAC hopes to break the stranglehold of elite patrons and develop the potential of the people to challenge existing inequalities and traditional ways of thinking.

Organizational Structure and Reach. BRAC is a large organization of over two thousand paid staff, of whom 1,600 are in the field. The basic unit of management is the center or field office which oversees 30-40 villages and at least one men's and one women's organization per village. The center manager is assisted by three program organizers (POs) who supervise twenty village organizations. POs are assisted by *Palli Shebok* (PS) or *Gram Shebikas* (GS), male and female village workers, respectively. Forty-five center managers report to five regional managers who are responsible ultimately to the executive director and founder, F.H. Abed (Luz 1991: 127).

BRAC works through target groups which in 1989 were estimated to be 5,000, distributed in 1,746 villages (IDSS 1989). They start from village organizations which federate into men's and women's Union Coordination Committee, and all the way up to the national level. It needs mention that combined men's and women's meetings taking place in BRAC organizations are a marked change from traditional Muslim sex segregation in public places (Luz 1991: 126).

BRAC has so developed its approach that it can confidently state that it would take an average PS/GS six months to organize a group in each of five villages of their assignment (IDSS 1989). These field workers have up to ten years of formal schooling. Program Organizers are usually young male university graduates in their twenties.[10]

Expenses are kept low. The monthly salary of a field worker is Tk. 2,000, and the direct cost of forming a group ready for a social or economic venture is Tk. 2,400. At this low cost, the vast scope of BRAC can be appreciated when one learns that its annual expenditure is in the neighborhood of US$6-8 million in 1987, with major donors from as many as nine different countries (Luz 1991: 117; IDSS 1989).[11] That vastness can be seen from another perspective: the number of beneficiaries of its programs. For instance, the Manikganj program has 18,327 members, nonformal primary education, 21,903 (IDSS 1989); the rural development program, 335,861 landless poor in 7,318 villages; the oral dehydration training, 12 million households[12] (Fakir 1991: 160).

Examples of Major Programs. A few programs are described below to show how the BRAC undertakes its work and how the state relates to it in the process.

The BRAC Irrigation Program created "new forms of social ownership of technologies," in this instance, deep tube-wells (Lewis 1993: 52). The landless poor gain access to resource and power and acquire rural property rights (other than land) by managing and operating these irrigation facilities and selling the water to local farmers in return for a proportion of the crop (Mustafa *et al.* 1993; Wood and Palmer-Jones 1990).

In the 1970s, control of irrigation equipment and other technologies was reposed in the parastatal Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). In 1979, BRAC entered into a formal agreement with BADC to install and service its groups' wells. Arrangements for credit with a government bank so that they could purchase the equipment did not proceed as smoothly. Although BRAC was able to negotiate successfully with top bank officials, its employees at the local level and the BRAC groups were not able to deal with each other well. Thus, BRAC had to develop its own capacity to provide credit to its members without having to rely on government. Over time, BRAC provided not only credit facilities but also information, skill and training to the water buyers and sellers. Because of this, when the government decided to privatize irrigation facilities, an increasing number of landless groups were able to enjoy social ownership of the wells (Mustafa *et al.* 1993).

The Child Survival Program (CSP) aims to assist the government in reducing the infant mortality rate of 130 per thousand and child mortality rate of 25 per 1000. The CSP involves both distribution of Vitamin A capsules (VAC) and immunization. It grew out of BRAC's pioneering oral rehydration therapy (ORT) program to attack diarrhea, the number one killer of children. For this BRAC trained over 1,000 young high-school educated village women to systematically teach millions of households how to make ORT from salt, water and dry molasses ('gur') since ready-made capsules were expensive and not readily available (Khanna 1984: 108).

VAC distribution took place in 19 districts, an assistance "recognized and acclaimed by government authorities at all levels." To do it, BRAC conducted training in social mobilization and technical orientation to government health and family planning workers, prepared an action plan for VAC, and distributed the capsules. As a result, the VAC coverage rate in 1988 in two districts surveyed was 97.7 percent (IDSS 1989: 18).

BRAC started an immunization program in 1986 after its success in the Oral Rehydration Therapy program. Concentrating on two unions, it was able to give 80 percent of the children under two years of age there their third dose of diphteria, pertussis, tetanus (DPT) vaccination.

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Encouraged by these results to undertake a larger program in immunization, BRAC had to ask itself hard questions, especially the consistency of the program with its empowerment strategy, the program's complexity and sustainability, and the wisdom of its original stance of bypassing government. It also noted that although the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) had been launched in 1979, it had reached only two percent of infants as of 1985, a result that raised questions about the capacity of government to undertake the program by itself.

In 1986, the government, assisted by United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank, decided to intensify EPI to enable it to reach 85 percent of infants by 1989. Among its new strategies was to invite NGOs experienced in social mobilization to complement the government effort. Accordingly, BRAC proposed collaboration along with other NGOs. The thrust of the agreement was to couple BRAC's success in mobilization with government's strength in supplying materials. Cooperation was effected at all levels, from the national down to the union and ward levels.

BRAC undertook the project without forgetting its commitment to ORT. Thus, while mobilizing the community during immunization days, it reinforced the ORT message (Khan 1991: 145). When EPI needed nationwide training for mid-level civil servants, BRAC prepared its particular kind of training[13] for EPI personnel, decentralized it, offered its training centers as venues and trained trainors. Its Research and Evaluation Division conducted research on coverage, perceptions of people on EPI diseases and the profile of EPI volunteers. BRAC also undertook planning, advocacy, policy formulation, and mass communication (Fakir 1991: 165).

Overall, the EPI results as of 1987-88 were 38 percent. Among the implementors, BRAC had the highest rate at 47 percent (Fakir 1991).

The Backyard Poultry Program was a source of income for landless women. It began in the 1970s as a participatory action research to increase productivity of poultry. Selected women called key rearers (KRs) were trained by the Department of Livestock, a government agency, and the BRAC in good rearing practices for chicks. Another group of women received training as poultry workers (PWs) who vaccinate the poultry for a fee. The vaccines were given free by government which controls its supply and distribution. Since the target groups were poor women, the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation (DoRR) was also involved.

This collaboration was aimed "to orient and activate local level functionaries toward the specific needs of the poorest by involving them in meaningful implementation of different programs" (Mustafa *et al.* 1993: 79). By 1983, the government had formally replicated the scheme at Manikganj,

overcoming skepticism of local civil servants about the ability of poor women to undertake vaccination. Besides government, the BRAC had acquired the World Food Program (WFP) as a partner, such that 33,000 KRs now undertake vaccination commercially and almost 5,500 are part of the training for Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development, a joint project of BRAC, DoRR and WFP (Mustafa *et al.* 1993: 79-80).

Assessment of the BRAC. The BRAC approach recognizes the special needs of its country by focused targeting on the poor, the landless, and the women. It has developed a multifaceted program which also builds up on the strengths of previous accomplishments, as the expanding program on child survival reveals. At the same time, it undertakes a professional approach, not only with its choice of graduates as key field personnel, but also in its emphasis on training and its use of research as a basis for decisions and program planning.

BRAC has chosen the middle road between modernity and tradition. It has bowed to the village ethos by hiring only men for nighttime community mobilization. At the same time, it has empowered women in education, health and income-generation and in giving them equal voice in BRAC-sponsored organizations. It developed social technology as it discovered wells, a physical infrastructure, as a nonland resource which can be a base for social ownership of the means of production. It has given the appropriate technology of ORT from scratch to allow homes the capacity to save their own children.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The case studies have shown varied ways in which the specific programs under study have shown an adherence to participatory and decentralized people-centered development and the role of the state in providing an enabling and facilitating environment there. Let us deal with each issue in turn.

Participatory and Decentralized People-Centered Development

All the programs tried to pursue a human and holistic concept of development. The people-centeredness of Saemaul Undong is shown by its soliciting their preferences for projects—a radical step for many Korean villagers, specially in the 1970s. It organizes the community, trains the people for leadership and technical tasks, inspires them to commitment to cooperation, integrity and self-confidence, and improves their living conditions.

The village is the focus of its efforts and decisions were made at that level, an attempt at both participation and decentralization. However, higher

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levels were more official- than people-involving, culminating in a scandal at the top that the people were not involved in or were prepared for. The lack of popular structures at supra-village level, and the authorization to short-circuit bureaucratic channels to reach the President lessened the chances of Saemaul Undong to be institutionalized and to sustain its activities beyond the term or interest of central officials, thus vitiating the element of decentralization it had started to build.

For its part, the KPP exhibited people-centeredness by its choice of cooperatives as the focus of its concerns, this organization being composed of persons, most of them needy, who are committed to help themselves. Poor farmers and women have been especially helped and incomes have increased dramatically. Moreover, KPP supports training not only for skills but also for values, thus strengthening the inner core of people. Having chosen persons who have already decided to participate, the program further supports them in maintaining and strengthening their participatory vehicle, their co-op. At the same time, the Bulacan government picks from their leadership people who could provide policy advice and consultation in its popular councils. The decentralization element is of two levels: (1) the assistance of KPP is such that it supports the structure of cooperativism, so that the union can help the federation which will in turn assist the primaries, and the lower levels in turn can keep the higher levels strong with continued membership; and (2) the KPP being an innovation of a province manifests the capacity of the local government to engage in decentralized development.

The Sarvodaya movement is also people-caring, reaching down to uplift the most underserved communities. Its style of organizing and training complemented technical topics with strong value orientation in Buddhist humanistic principles. The kind of participation it developed was more intensive in terms of both sectors and levels: (1) it encouraged the formation of different organizations for each sector—youth, women, etc.—in the village and it put their membership into ever-widening circles of interaction for people of their kind all the way to the national level; and (2) popular representatives made policy and ran programs at each level, assisted by trained paid and volunteer workers. The level of decentralization it developed can be gleaned not only from its structure but also from the fact that people from these poor villages were able to contribute substantially to manage the programs they themselves planned for. Perhaps a problem that could be raised is how, thinking of themselves as village republics, the sense of nationhood and belonging to a larger community may be instilled among village folks.

The Bangladesh NGO continues from the same frame of reference about development as the other programs. It seeks the participation of people in their own development, first through involvement in their own villages, and then in being concerned with affairs at higher levels. Group formation is

undertaken not only for its own sake, but also for empowering the poor to find their own means of uplifting themselves. More than the others, the BRAC centers not only on human beings as subjects, but on the most disadvantaged among them, those lacking in resources and discriminated against due to gender. It antedated the strategy of focused targeting now used by UNICEF by maybe two decades.

Thus, although two are government programs reaching out to civil society, and the others are NGOs linking on various occasions with the state, their vision of development appears to be converging with the people-centered, participatory and decentralized model we had posited at the start. While involved in economic and technical projects, they are not focused on materialistic production. Rather they develop appropriate physical and social technology and lay emphasis on the development of communities and people and their engagement in decisions that affect their lives. They think of development as a whole, not simply the increase of income, but also its social and political dimensions. In addition, all the case programs stress value change, the transformation of people and the development of women. Although not in the environmental field, Saemaul Undong, Sarvodaya and BRAC have activities towards sustainable development. And they are joined by KPP in looking at their work as a long-term effort to change not just the small villages where they work, but the wider nation.

The State as Enabler and Facilitator

The state has played a key role in all the cases. However, that role is not always supportive of civil society organizations and their developmental mission. Its restrictions on basic freedoms and the inability of certain sections or levels of government to recognize the advantages of cooperation and mutual trust are the prime deterrents to a positive role of the state.

Nevertheless, on the whole, the state has shown ways of enabling and facilitating development. Although now relegated to obscurity, Saemaul Undong imparts lessons on how government may take very strong enabling and facilitating roles. As enabler, the Korean State created a concept and an organizational structure that made possible a decentralized, participatory and people-centered development. Its practice of allowing people to choose the projects relevant to their lives also had the bonus of making development concrete and tangible to the villagers. It also managed to develop leaders from the village level who participated beyond community organizing to higher political positions and economic enterprises.

While withholding local autonomy from the local government structure, Saemaul allowed decisionmaking to be exercised at levels closest to the

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ground, and established mechanisms that ensured that people's decisions are heeded. It is not farfetched to assume that the authorities now enjoyed by elected local governments may be traced to the experience in the Saemaul Undong movement.

Aside from the institutional and conceptual framework, the State also provided facilities. Training programs appear to be a positive facility in that it produced not only leaders for the villages but also linkages between them and higher levels. At the same time, they, along with the experience in the projects themselves, developed the proper spirit for development work. Training and practice in democratic governance seem to be positive but unintended consequences of the training of leaders, but they are indispensable for truly decentralized and participatory development.

Some facilities had positive and negative effects. Technical advice for development projects, for instance, was a facility that sometimes exceeded its bounds and became little short of dictation especially for fledgling grassroots participants. The state also provided funds. Again, while this could motivate decentralized development, it appears to have done the opposite, as dependence on government funds increased toward the end of Saemaul's life.

The role of the state in the Saemaul Undong experience is paramount and decisive. As conceptualizer, initiator and chief support, it enabled the villagers and the villages to make decisions for themselves and to give their leadership and labor to making their desired projects and plans come true. However, there remains the requirement of an energizing organization outside the government bureaucracy to sustain the development effort, particularly the attitudinal changes. Here, the village experience was not sustained at higher levels as scaling up remained under the control of civil servants rather than popular participants. The absence of such an organization might also have accounted for decreasing contributions from the people as the government retreated from the scene.

In analyzing the KPP, one must first get over the problem that government help to self-help organizations almost sounds like a contradiction in terms. The Bulacan case appears to be one that has managed to find the appropriate balance. The state has provided an enabling environment at the highest level—through a strong set of constitutional provisions, the Cooperatives Code and the Local Government Code—but it is up to individual agencies and local units to concretize that support in their own areas of authority. The Provincial Government of Bulacan complemented the constitutional and legal support with its own enabling schemes and actions. First, there was high policy recognition and political support. The decisions of the Provincial Development Council and the *Sangguniang Magsasaka* incorporated the views of the cooperatives' leaders through their membership

in the councils and a system of consulting them on relevant issues. Then it created an agency for cooperative development which recognized its background role and helped through a reciprocal effort—its leadership came from the ranks of cooperatives themselves, and its staff were lent to a federation to strengthen it.

Facilitating efforts are also in evidence. Training programs, loans to start up cooperatives, commodity grants, technical assistance, even recommendations to a higher level to utilize the cooperatives have been provided by KPP. Through the KPP other government and private-sector agencies also channel their efforts to allow the cooperatives to grow and to sustain their growth. On the whole, Bulacan government support through KPP has strengthened rather than weakened the cooperatives even in the area of self-reliance.

On this paradoxical point, the contention of Norman Uphoff bears mention. Uphoff suggests that cooperatives need "assisted self-reliance." This is "a strategy for using external resources—advice, funds, training, and material assistance—not so much to produce direct results as to strengthen local capacities to initiate, manage, modify, and sustain activities that produce benefits for which the poor are responsible" (cited in Gaffud 1995: 17). In these terms, KPP has provided the assistance without vitiating the promotion of self-help of the cooperatives. At the same time, it has opened up paths by which they can voice out their demands on policy questions. In becoming a government agency which facilitates without taking over, KPP has also brought out an important role for politicians—a personal commitment in helping their constituents reach collective goals without using it to serve their private interests as persons needing support for their electoral pursuits.

The role of the state in Sarvodaya's success is not clear-cut. Its series of laws, in periods of mistrust of NGOs, was disabling, a government trying to control the programs and flow of funds to the movement lest it be the conduit of foreign agencies destabilizing the state. On the other hand, the same kind of laws may be regarded as enabling. Certainly voluntary registration in 1961 opened the door for closer relationship rather than for greater control. It also appears that the NGO Commission which caused so much pain in 1989 did proceed to be supportive and facilitative under a new understanding of GO-NGO roles in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the state provided facilities throughout the four decades of Sarvodaya, sometimes even during periods of strain. The recourse to Sarvodaya training programs allowed the movement to infuse its ideas into the bureaucracy. Funds and resources given in collaborative projects also facilitated the continuation of the work of the NGO. In the Sarvodayan case, the government also acted as a facilitator of programs as it "bought" its

innovations and social technologies, such as the conservation stoves, the leaf porridge and the drug rehabilitation program. In addition, the special expertise of Sarvodaya in reconciliation and rehabilitation was also used. The psychic facility of recognizing the unique contributions of the movement to Sri Lankan society through government's imitation and adoption of Sarvodaya programs must thus be acknowledged.

The role of the state in the BRAC experience looms large primarily as a facilitator. It provided vaccination supplies for poultry and infants, assisted in getting equipment for the landless workers' irrigation program, and helped it get poultry for the poor women's livelihood. Like Sarvodaya, the state acted as facilitator in its recognition of where the NGO was superior: its acclaim of its ORT program, its seeking of collaboration with it on grounds of its experience in mobilization, and its acknowledgment of its capacity for training and management development.

The government role as enabler is more muted, perhaps in many cases, non-existent or even adversarial. But one must recognize that the huge financial donations of foreign foundations could not have reached BRAC had the state been completely restrictive. In fact, funds did not stop even during the Ershad period, which was also the time EPI sought the BRAC's assistance in training and social mobilization.

The GO-NGO debate in Bangladesh as applied to BRAC shows how the state may be encouraged to play an enabling role even when some in its top leadership may be more inclined to do otherwise. The state premises its regulations on performance and accountability: it may be argued that BRAC could proceed as it did because its huge professional organization showed impressive performance that even a hostile state could not counter.

Lessons and Suggestions for Future State Action

The first lesson this analysis of good development practices tells the state is to highlight its primary enabling role, which is to allow NGOs and all within its borders to exercise the basic freedoms of expression and assembly, freedoms which recognize the essence of being human. Their curtailment has led to conflict and loss of lives, and even to the delegitimacy of the state. Authoritarian governments may be able to accelerate economic growth, but it would fall short of the person-centered development that is now being sought.

The second lesson is the need to recognize the role of all sectors—state, market, civil society—in the pursuit of development. Particularly, the state should not see NGOs primarily as alternatives to its delivery system but should also recognize the special qualities they bring to the enterprise—caring, commitment to the poor and unserved, the capacity to risk and experiment.

There are lessons also in the way the enabling power of the state has been illustrated in the different cases. As enabler, government is supposed to encourage programs that try to get at the same national goal of development that it is pursuing. A constitutional framework to encourage NGOs, as the Philippines has, gives the message of strong political will for this task which is not dependent on the whims of different regimes. But short of that, laws and even just presidential proclamations of the same vein could already provide the field within which civil society organizations can serve development goals. Note that in the Sri Lankan case, the same law was interpreted to both disable and enable NGOs at different times. This is a sensitive subject that must be more carefully analyzed. The state as it regulates always adds benefits to some and costs to others. It must therefore provide for review and evaluation of its acts so that it can be assured that it is distributing costs and benefits consistent with its developmental vision.

Beyond the legal strictures, the state enables through its organizational mechanisms. The creation of governmental bodies with authority to assist more than to regulate NGOs was used in all the countries. The appointment in Bulacan of a person with co-op links to head it is a bonus. It is also interesting that, though adding to the structure, the unit of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Korea and the PCEDO in the Philippines did not seem to be big organizations.

In keeping with participatory quality of development, governments also set up consultative bodies composed of government and nongovernmental officers: Korea had its central government council, the Philippine province its development and agriculture councils and Sri Lanka an NGOs Commission which initially seemed anti-NGO but which became more supportive later. For Bangladesh, this occurred at sectoral program level, notably for EPI. These participatory transorganizational bodies could provide those who are technically clients of government to have a role in discussing and formulating policies relevant to their sector. This would make policy bodies at the administrative level both more representative and more responsive. However, a caveat is in order. Unless there is an attempt at just and fair representation, such bodies could be easily captured by the special interest of the persons lucky enough to sit there.

The state facilitates through the provision of different kinds of resources. Funds allowed the village organizations and NGOs to perform their tasks, but it must be noted that these are provided following clear criteria and rules. Dole-outs are no longer acceptable; thus, generation of local resources and counterpart funds has been invoked. KPP additionally allowed secondary co-ops to screen for grants and loans, a task to increase their sense of responsibility for using the facility wisely. Every state must conceive of mechanisms like this which will ensure that funds are to be used in an accountable manner.

1996

Another important facility is training which both Saemaul and KPP gave to their clients so that they can undertake their programs with appropriate methods and values. For its part, Sarvodaya received support so that it can undertake its training and development programs. Training is a significant facility for the state in that through it government can propagate the vision it has for the society. It is clear in the Bangladeshi case that this is a two-way process since it was able to infuse its participatory, life-oriented, learner-centered view of training into presumably hardened bureaucrats. Programs which allow for real discussions and debates can make those experiences as learning points for the policies of both government and the civil society organization.

Research, information and other means of technical advice and assistance are types of facilities that government may be able to provide. Necessarily they would be in the specific area of expertise of the government agency concerned. Nevertheless, they need not be looked upon as limiting, in that government provision of these resources can be means of broadening the horizons of the organizations being served, perhaps by getting them acquainted with the relative effectiveness of different approaches. On the other hand, the advice for a broad perspective must be two-way, in that the state should also take care not to give biased or only self-serving information. That could have happened when Saemaul Undong was starting out, during which civil servants and political officials might have pressured the villages to pick their preferred projects rather than those needed and desired by the people themselves.

Government recognition of the performance of the organizations should not be neglected for its role in motivating them to continued effectiveness. This pertains first to the incentives and awards that the state—and other institutions—may give to well-performing NGOs. But it could also include, as in the Sarvodaya and BRAC cases, the state's decision to adopt the technologies it has developed; its request for it to take care of difficult geographic or program areas can encourage NGOs to persist in their good work. The cases studied here had been encouraged by such recognition.

To have listed here the things a state can do as enabler and facilitator may be misleading, for it suggests a disjointed set of acts that one could get off the shelf as the need seems to arise. Therefore it is necessary to bring back the idea that the state is an orchestrator, not playing the music directly, but conducting well so that all the elements of society can learn how they can contribute. In doing this, the vision of a people-centered development must be in sharp focus. Then it should recognize the strengths and weaknesses of each actor, how well they can play the roles of complement, competitor and collaborator to the state actions. Moreover, the decision on how to provide the enabling and facilitating environment will not be the state's alone.

Representation, involvement and engagement of all the sectors would be called for, not because it is fashionable, but because it is in their participation that the program can be conceived in all their comprehensiveness, refined from all angles, and the other actors encouraged to undertake the same adventure.

Endnotes

[1]See for instance Wade's careful study of "the state-market dilemma" which showed a "governed market" in Taiwan and Korea, and earlier, in Japan, with "strong protection policies in the context of a strong government emphasis on exports," "enterprises competing and sometimes cooperating under state supervision, in the context of heavy investment in education" (Wade 1995: 119, 123). In the ASEAN region, the strongest advocate of laissez faire government was Singapore. Yet ASEAN's first newly industrialized country (NIC) reached that status with a government which presided more effectively over the economy than avowedly socialist states (Tan 1995).

[2]This section draws from and revises sections of Cariño 1995.

[3]"*Kaunlaran sa pagkakaisa*" is Tagalog for "development in unity."

[4]Sarvodaya has been recognized through the various awards received by its founder, e.g., Ramon Magsaysay Award for Leadership, Manila 1969; The King Boudouin Award for International Development, Belgium 1982; The Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Award, USA 1986; The August Forel Award for Promoting Sobriety in the World, Denmark 1990; and The Jamnalal Baja Award for Promoting Ghandian Values in the World, India 1990 (Perera *et al.* 1992: 138).

[5]"Shramadana" refers to a gift of one's time, thought and effort.

[6]The word was coined by Mahatma Gandhi to refer to a social order different from the capitalist and socialist models (Perera *et al.* 1992).

[7]The figure includes 182 societies ready for registration in 1995 (Sarvodaya 1993-94: 19).

[8]They include the Jamalpur women's program (14 years), the Manikganj integrated development program (13), craft marketing (10), and the rural development program (10) (IDSS 1989).

[9]Landless are organized primarily as pressure groups against landed interests; BRAC envisions that it will eventually withdraw from a village in favor of the organized poor (Luz 1991, passim). To show targeting of females: 60% of pupils in the nonformal education program are intended to be girls; the Jamalpur program was focused primarily on landless women workers (Luz 1991: 119, 123).

[10]Although it targets women in its programs, most of BRAC field staff are male, bowing to Islamic society norms which do not allow women to travel alone after dark, a necessity in field work. Organizers are required to have academic degrees because only graduates have sufficient skills for the requirements of BRAC as a professional development organization. They are then extensively trained in the Training and Resource Center which in 1984 conducted over 400 courses for 9,000 participants of which 20% were exclusively for BRAC staff (Luz 1991: 127-29).

[11]To maintain its independence, BRAC policy does not allow it to take funds from any one donor of more than 20% of its budget (Luz 1991: 117).

[12]Also using 1989 figures, IDSS estimates are much lower: 118,775 households reached by the rural development program, 2,596,314 households by the oral rehydration theraphy program (1989: 37).

[13]In Fakir's (1991: 169) words, this was "participatory, learner-centered, problem-based, life-oriented, need-oriented, experience-based, flexible and action/result-oriented."

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